16 Contemporary theories of exercise behavior have been the products of the so-called cognitive revolution, which has shaped the dominant paradigm in psychology over the past several decades. Cognitive theories rely on the assumption that, in making behavioral decisions, humans collect I' .' relevant information and make their selections on the basis of a more-or-Iess rational analysis of ':~"'this information. Although the dominance of cognitive theories in the field of exercise psychology ' :t is unquestionable, evidence suggests that they leave most of the variance in exercise behavior unaccounted and interventions based on them are of limited effectiveness in changing exercise behavior. This chapter reviews the history and evaluates the potential of an alternative approach, namely the hedonic theory of motivation. This idea, long neglected due the fascination of l<' : .psychologists with information-processing models of the mind, attributes a substantial portion of the '~:,<,variance in decision-making to affective processes. Modern iterations of the idea emerging from-the .:/ fields of neurology and behavioral economics reaffirm the ancient thesis that, in the long run, humans ,L·. tend to 'repeat what makes them feel better and tend to avoid what makes them feel worse. Evidence :.' from studies in the context of exercise suggests that affective responses to exercise vary greatly ,between individuals. Furthermore, despite a still-evolving methodological platform, preliminary studies show that affective responses to exercise predict subsequent exercise behavior. This line of research and theorizing offers a novel and intriguing perspective on the mechanisms underlying behavioral decision-making in the context of exercise. The literature reviewed in this chapter highlights the need for further research on the motivational implications of affective processes and lays the foundation for development of a hedonic theory of exercise behavior.
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Exercise psychology is a scientific field in the midst of a Kuhnlan crisis. An old paradigm, according to which behavioral decisions (such as the decision to engage in, adhere to, or disengage from physical activity) are guided by the rational cognitive analysis of available information, has started to show its weaknesses. Over the past 20 years, a period during which more information about the health benefits of physical activity has become available than ever before, the percentage of people engaging in regular physical activity has remained stagnant. Cognirive models typically account for less than 25% of the variation in physical activity behavior. It would be hard to deny that there must be additional sources of variance and that these should be explored. This chapter is about the untapped potential represented by one such variable-namely, affect.
On the Brink of a Kulmian Revolution?
To place the currenr situation in exercise psychology in historical context and to better understand the underlying intellectual conflict between the old and new paradigm, it is useful to revisit some of Thomas Kuhn's timeless insights about the emergence of scientific revolutions. According to Kuhn ( /1996 , "normal science" is a label that describes "research firmly based upon oneor more past scientific achievements, achievements that some particular scientific community acknowledges for a time as supplying the foundation for irs further practice" (p, 10) . Normal science operates on the basis of "paradigms." A paradigm is a cornbination of theory, practice, and instrumentation rhar acts as an accepted example of scientific practice. Paradigms serve a crucial function in the scientific enterprise because they "provide models fromwhich spring particular coherent traditions of scientihc research" (p. 10).
Once a paradigm is established, the main function of "normal-scientific') research is "the' artieulation of those phenomena and theories mat me _ paradigm already supplies" (Kuhn, /1996 . What normal science does not do is [0 observe and consider new phenomena ("indeed those that will not fit the box are often not seen at all," P: 24) and to develop new theories (scien- tists are even 'coften intolerant of those invented by others,') p. 24). According to Kuhn, "normal science does not aim at novelties of fact or theory and, when successful, finds none)' (p. 52). In the proccõ f articulating the components of the paradigm, SCI· entists develop increasingly elaborate instrumenrs, Once it has achieved the status of paradigm, a scientific theory is declared invalid only if an alternate candidate is available to take its place. ... The act of judgment that leads scientists to reject a previously accepted theory is always based upon more than a comparison of that theory with the world. The decision to reject one paradigm is always simultaneously the decision to accept' another, and the judgment leading to that decision involves the comparison of both paradigms with nature and with each other. (Kuhn) /1996 p. 77).
an application should be ineffective when long practice has clearly established its utility (or conversely, the paradigm predicts that an application should be , effective when practice reliably demonstrates its failure). As a result of such discrepancies, the anomaly becomes more widely recognized (e.g., replicated and confirmed by a broader circle of scientists) and even catches the attention of prominent figures in. the field. The anomaly then becomes "the new fixation point ofscientific scrutiny" (Kuhn) 1962/1996, p..83) and its resolution becomes a shared goaL One of the defining features of a field in crisis is the emergence of multiple and divergent attempts to resolve the anomaly. As these attempts multiply, they also become more diversified. Although early attempts may follow the rules of the paradigm closely, the persistence of the anomaly begs "ad hoc adjustments" (p. 83) of the paradigm that are increasingly bold and unruly. Thus "the rules of normal science become increasingly blurred. Though there still is a paradigm, few practitioners prove to be entirely agreed about what it is. Even formerly standard solutions of solved problems are called in question" (p. 83).
A crisis is a powerful transformacive force, because it brings forth critical thinking and creativiry. According to Kuhn ( /1996 , "the transition from a paradigm in crisis to a new one from which a new tradition of normal science can emerge is far from a cumulative process, one achieved by an articulation or extension of the old paradigm"
(pp. [84] [85] . Instead) a crisis forces "a reconstruction of the field from new fundamentals, a reconstruction that changes some of the field's most elementary theoretical generalizations as well as many of its paradigm methods and applications" (p, 85). Such "reconstructions» progress slowly and usually against considerable resistance. Formerly dominant paradigms do not just collapse or disappear overnight:~r ;C"" I~k increasingly esoreric vocabulary, an increasingly t;J~'\~f11plex skill set, and increasingly refined concepts.
i,/i1he unintended consequences of these develop{>inentS are the "immense restriction of the scientist's~\ :?/l~s'ion)' and a "considerable resistance to paradigm ,'J,,;.1/ f0~j':ihwge." In essence, science becomes "increasingly \V/~.JigidU (p. 64).
::lh~.<::. How, then, does progress occur? According to ;\:' ;' ;.:guh n , a mature paradigm, despite its rigidity and :):J(tesistance to change, is a prerequisite for change. ti:~{:~:1he reason is that a paradigm precisely specifies i~::~:Avhat is anticipated. For example, it leads to the ')I~:'deve1opmentof instruments specifically engineered ·.'t~:~;[6-find the "anticipated" result and trains researchers /,;~; ;;,':[o: detect even the most in tricare matches between :);":paradigm-based predicrions and observations. This ',:!j':-/siruarion creates the conditions for the observation :'f>~f C'anomalies," the engine of scientific progress.
: ' :ii;\kuhn (1962) defined an "anomaly" as "nature's [aiI-I:,·",·;,.
Ir;~~y:tire to conform entirely to expectation" (p, 762).~;~~A nomalies appear "only against the background :;·i~,;·,.i~iovided by the paradigm," and in fact, "the more :r~(,pt'ecise and far-reaching that paradigm is, the more :~{;~sensitive an indicator it provides of anomaly and t~~':~~ence of an occasion for paradigm change" (Kuhn, l~~~::'~962/1996, p. 65).~:
'/,~'~;, Clearly) not all anomalies result in progress. Thẽ
V:v~srmajority are ignored. When an anomaly persists
'~~fpYer an extended period of time, the most common ;"U~ffect is that scientists will attempt to alter their~~' ri'nstrurnentationin a way that makes the anomaly :0;::~isappear or they will try to make the anomaly fit it~f{;~ithjn the paradigm (i.e., modify the expectation :~~~nd rhus make the former anomaly seem expected). /W~ccording to Kuhn ( /1996 , "they will devise ;fH.humerous articulations and ad hoc modifications of \1~~l:.~eir theory in order to eliminate any apparent cont[~r~'~,~t" (p. 78). In general, "when confronted by even ::~~~'~~vere and prolonged anomalies" that make them ' , : ,:?~:'begin to lose faith [and] consider alternatives," sci-: : :~~}[~lltists "do no t reno unce the paradigm that has led ;~j~t,wem into crisis" (p. 77). The main reason is that ,~j\i~in manufacture so in science-retooling is an
Much like political revolutions, scientific revolutions "are inaugurated by a growing sense, ... often restricted to a narrow subdivision of the sci-. enrific community, that an existing paradigm has ceased to function adequately in the exploration of an aspect of nature to which that paradigm itself had previously led the way" (p. 92). Scientific revolutions, therefore, are "those non-cumulative developmental episodes in which an older paradigm is replaced in whole or in part by an incompatible new one" (p. 92).
What Is the Dominant Paradigm in Exercise Psychology?
All currently prominent models of physical activity or exercise behavior are exemplars of the same paradigm. The health belief model (Rosenstock, Strecher, & Becker, 1988) , the theory of planned behavior (Ajzen, 1991) , the social cognitive theory (Bandura, 1986) ) and (to a large extent) the rranstheoretical model (Prochaska & DiClemente, 1982) are all products of the so-called cognitive revolution. As' such, they all rely on the fundamental assumption that in making behavioral decisions, people collect and analyze the relevant information that is available to them, rationally weigh pros and cons, and make complicated probabilistic predictions about the future consequences of their actions.
For example, according to the theories of reasoned. action and planned behavior, "people think and act in more or less logical ways" (Ajzen, 2005, p. 29) . Human behavior "can be described as reason~d)) (Ajzen & Fishbein, 2005, p. 203) in the sense that the decision to act "rests ultimately on the information people have relevant to the behavior" (Ajzen & Fishbein, 2005, p. 195) . In social cognitive theory, cognitive processing also plays the central role in decision making. People are described as data processors, constantly engaged in collecting and analyzing information:
Many activities involve inferential judgments about conditional relations between events in probabilistic environments. Discernment of predictive rules requires cognitive processing of multidimensional information that contains many ambiguities and uncertainties. In ferreting out predictive rules, people must draw on their state of knowledge to generate hypotheses about predictive facrors, to weight and integrate them into composite rules, to test their judgments against outcome information, and to remember which norions they had tested and how well they had worked. (Bandura) 1989) p. 1176) Similarly, according to the rranstheoretical mod I in approaching the decision to change their beh eI avior, people are constantly engaged in analYZing and comparing pros and cons and make decisions that basis: "for most problem behaviors pe~ple w~d ecide that the pros of changing. the behavior 0 Utweigh the cons before they take action to modify their behavior" (Prochaska er at, 1994, p. 44).
, It is also striking that within the framework of these popular theories, all of which have been adopted from social and health p~ychology [0 account for exercise behavior, exercise is considered just another variant of health behavior (similar to practicing safe sex, brushing one's teeth, or eating fruits and vegetables). Yet exercise appears to have near-zero correlations with other heaJrll behaviors, suggesting that its underlying regulatory mechanisms are, at least in part, distinct (Newsom McFarland, Kaplan, Huguet, & Zani, 200S) : Nevertheless, popular broad-scope theories do nor take this uniqueness of exercise into consideration. Acknowledging this point, Rhodes and Nigg (2011) write that "there is adequate, if not overwhelming, evidence to suggest that unique theories of [physical activity] should be pursued" (p: 114).
Anomalies in the Paradigm
The "physical activity paradox" is one ofthe most frustrating phenomena in public health. On the one hand, physical activity is arguably, as the larc Jeremy Morris (1994) famously put it, "today'sbest buy in public health." This characterization is convincingly supported by compelling epidemiologic and experimental evidence across a broad rangeof conditions (Miles, 2007; Pedersen & Saltin, 2006i Warburton, Katzmarzyk, Rhodes, & Shephard, 2007) . On the other hand, promoting physical activity to the public has proven a very "tough sell" (Dishman, 2001 ). This situation challenges [he notion that human beings make decisions on the basis of rational information processing. However. that idea is a core assumption of most con[emp orary theories of health (and physical actlvjcy) behavior. Such theories are built on the belief chac when presented with a behavioral option that can credibly lower the risk of an important negative outcome (e.g., death), most people, thinking and acting rationally, will select that option. Pate et al., 1995) . Even of those who rated physical inactivity as a "very important" health risk factor, about two-thirds (64.20/0) did not engage in the minimum recommended levels of activity. In other words, despite the fact that "message penetration" about the health benefits of physical activity in U.S. society seems excellent (at rates of 85-950/0), participation in physical activity remains low. Just how low became evident with the publication of results from the first nationwide study of acceierornerry-based activity monitoring. Troiano et al. (2008) reported mat among adults berween the ages of 20 and 59 years, only 3.50/0 (3.8% of men, 3.20/0 of women) participated in bouts of at least moderate-intensity physical activity totaling at least 30 minutes per day on at least 5 days per week. For those over the age of 60 years, the percentage was even lower, at 2.40/0(2.5% ofmen, 2.30/0ofwomen). A latent class analysis of the same data set showed that when every minute of activity was considered, 78.70/0 of the population was included in the two least active classes (33.60/0 averaging 5.3 minutes and 45.1 % averaging 21.0 minutes of moderateto-vigorous physical activity per day). When only activity performed in bouts of at least 10 minutes was considered (during which at least 70% of the accelerometer counts were above the threshold for moderate-to-vigorous activity), 93.5% of the population was included in the two least active classes (56.1 % averaging nearly zero and 37.40/0 averaging 10.3 minutes of moderate-to-vigorous physical activity per day). The data for vigorous activity are even more disconcerting. On 91.1 % of all days, participants accumulated less than 1 minute of vigorous physical activity on average. Of3,462 participants who provided valid data for at least three days, only 23 (0.660/0) registered 20 minutes of vigorous physical activity on at least three days per week (Metzger et al., 2008) .
In Australia, another country with social marketing campaigns promoting the health benefits of physical activity, the results have been similar. According to data from the National Physical Activity Survey, nearly all adults (920/0) said that they knew they would get health benefits if they did at least 30 minutes of moderate physical activity per day (Armstrong, Bauman, & Davies, 2000) . Nevertheless, over 500/0 did not reach this criterion (150/0 reported no leisure-time physical activity during the previous week, and another 40% accumulated fewer than 150 minutes of activity). From 1997 to 1999, knowledge about the health 
Emerging Alternative
Many authors who question the exclusive reliance of decision making on cognitive analysis tend to assign an important role to affective inA uences, reminding us that people general~y tend to do whac makes them feel better and tend to avoid whar makes them feel worse. For example, following his strong argument for bounded rationality, Simon (1983) suggested that "in order to have anything like a complete theory of human rationality, we have to understand what role emotion plays in it" (p. 29) . Before him, Young (1959) had argued that "any theory of behavior which ignores the concept of affectivity will be found inadequate as an explanation of the total facts" (p. 106). Along the same lines, in a thought-provoking and highly influential article that ignited a famous debate with Richard Lazarus, Robert Zajonc (1980) wrote: "We some" times delude ourselves that we proceed in a ratio. . nal manner and weigh all the pros and cons of[he various alternatives. But this is probably seldom the actual case. Quite often 'I decided in favor of X' is no more than '1 liked X'" (p. 155) . Similarly" in the introduction of his landmark book Descartes described by cogmuve models of health behav.,/cr"i! lor, Herbert Simon, the 1978 Nobel laureate i j economics ("for his pioneering research into thO I decision-making process within economic organi~I zations"), argued that "human beings have neither I the facts nor the consistent structure of values nOr f the reasoning power at their disposal that Would -f be required" to perform the kinds of compUfatio ns ! that cogni.tive models entail (Si~on, 1983. p. 17) . I Instead, Simon suggested that human rationalit £ is very limited, very much bo unded by the Situ: I tion and by human computational powers') (p. 34), a notion now referred to as "bounded rationality." Other researchers have also criticized the assump_ tions of cognitive theories, focusing on the substantial deviations that human judgments' and behavioral choices often exhibit compared with standard models of rationality (e.g., Stanovich & West, 2000) . These researchers have proposed that ramer than being determined by a thorough and truly reasoned analysis, human decisions are aided by a set of "heuristics" (shortcuts or simplified rules) that, although frequently Hawed and biased, bring the complexity of problems down to the scale of human reasoning abilities and ultimately help people navigate their world. benefits of physical activity increased nationwide, but the percentage of people satisfying the guidelines decreased (Bauman et al., 2003) . Specifically, the percentage of people who knew that being more active is good for health increased from 85.0% to 88.1 %, and those who knew that brisk walking for, half an hour daily is good for health increased from 90.30/0 to 92.1 %. At the same time, the percentage who reported at least 150 minutes of physical activity on at least five days per week decreased from 50.90/0 to 45.2%.
Within specific studies, the results have been similarly discordant with rationality assumptions. For example, patients in cardiac rehabilitation (N = 353) were asked questio ns related to their perceived risk (e.g., "If I keep my lifestyle the way it was prior to the acute treatment, I will suffer from coronary health problems") (Schwarzer, Luszczynska, Ziegelmann, Scholz, & Lippke, 2008) . Their answers indicated that they were well aware of their elevated level of risk (M = 3.10 out of 4.00). However, the correlation of risk perception to the intention to be physically active (e.g., ttl intend to become physically active on a regular basis") was only r = .09. Outcome expectancy (e.g., "If I would exercise on a regular basis, then I would feel balanced in my daily life)); M = 3.60 out of 4.00) was also wealdy related to intention (r = .29).
Similarly, patients in orthopedic rehabilitation (N =368) reported high risk perception (e.g., "likelihood that you will ever suffer from chronic pain»; M = 2.96 out of 5.00)· and outcome expectancy (e.g., "If I would engage in physical exercise on 2 or more days per week, for at least 20 minutes each time, then I would be doing something good for my health"; M = 3.19 out of.4.00). However, neither variable correlated with intention (r = .03 and .11, respectively).
These and numerous other studies with similar results suggest that it might be erroneous to assume that the decision to engage in or adhere to an exercise program depends solely on the rational analysis and evaluation of information. The corollary is that appealing [0 the public's knowledge and rational reasoning as the cornerstone of intervention efforts, as is commonly the case (e.g., enumerating the health benefits of activity and the risks of inactivity), is unlikely to be very effective (e.g., Dishman & Buckworth, 1996) .
In fact, a growing number of theorists have questioned the ability of human beings to collect, process, and apply information in the manner ]~~~~cently, the idea has reappeared in diverse scienff¥J~c fields, incl uding social psychology (Baumeister, ~1~~J,~¥~hs, DeWall, & Zhang, 2007; Emmons & Diener,~0~~f~~8 6), behavioral economics (Kahneman, 1999;  ~lt~~:ewens[ein & Lerner, 2003; Mellers, 2004) , affecf01~~rf.~Ye neuroscience (Bechara, Darnasio, & Damasio, J~~I~i~~QOO; Darnasio, 1996; Naqvi, Shiv, & Bechara,~~~~P p6), and experimental physiology (Cabanac, In),
It is noteworthy that the idea that affect can be "a powerful motivator of behavior" seems to be much more influential in fundamentally interdisci plinary research fields than those that adhere closely to paradigms dictated by "mainstream" psychology. In effect, interdisciplinary fields have operated unrestrained by the influence of the cognitive tradition, which within psychology proper seems to have imposed an "immense restriction of the scientist's vision," to use Kuhn's ( /1996 words. For example, that eating behavior and food choices are driven at least in pare by the rewarding effects of food (Lutter & Nestler, 2009; Moore & O'Donohue, 2008; Stroebe, Papies, & Aarrs, 2008) has come to be regarded as almost self-evident. By extension, we readily accept that the pleasure associated with eating has contributed to the problem of obesity (Kishi & Elmquist) Rolls, 2007) .
Similarly, few would question that the addictive effects of drugs of abuse are mediated by pleasurable feelings (Bechara, 2005; Koob, 2008; Robinson & Berridge, 2008) .
In decision research, although most researchers still subscribe to information processing models, the role of affect has been gaining considerable ground. In a major review, Weber and Johnson (2009) noted the following: "Though successful in many ways, the cognitive revolution may have been too focused on analytic and computational processes. The emotions revolution of the past decade or so has tried to correct this overemphasis by documenting the prevalence of affective processes, depicting them as automatic and essentially effort-free inputs that orient and motivate adaptive behavior" (p, 65). Nevertheless, within the core of psychology, as acknowledged by Ajzen and Fishbein (2005) , "much of the research [stemming from cognitive theories of motivation and behavior] has devoted little attention to the role of emotion in the prediction of intentions and actions" (p. 203).
Overview of the Long History of Psychological Hedonism
The present generation of researchers in exercise psychology has been educated in an academic culture that is almost entirely devoid of information about the role of affect as a motivating force in human behavior. Tracing the historical origins and subsequent evolution and refinement of the idea of "psychological hedonism" by relying solely on the contemporary literature. However, the value of having this type of historical perspective cannot be overemphasized. First, it is crucial for researchers to appreciate that this is an idea that, despite ups and downs, has remained alive amid radical and tumultuous changes in philosophical and rnetatheoretical currents over the past 25 centuries. Second, it is important, as the phoenix of affect in psychological thought rises from the ashes once again, to avoid the pitfall of rediscovering the wheel by reigniting debates that have already taken place. Third, a solid understanding of the historical journey of the idea of psychological hedonism will inevitably reveal both its limitations and its strengths and will thus help contemporary researchers formulate modern iterations of the essential themes that are more (Mees & Schmitt, 2008 (Gosling & Taylor, 1982) . According to Plato (trans. 1997 :~t:;~t;;':/:'Arjstotle (384-322 BeE) accepted that "people ;~r:::~<~:'who fall short with regard to pleasures and delight 'jl~jti:,;jri chern less than they should are hardly found;
:f:l/t~'Jo'r such insensibility is not human» (Nicomacheañ ':Ei,);:iEthics, III, 1119a III, , 5, trans, 1984 . Endorsing an , : 1{~~:Tessenria1 hedonistic position, he believed that the ;t~1il~/rp'leasure associated with an activity is a crucial "~{~:';::\"de[erminant of how this activity will be priori-, }t~ig[izedJ since "the more pleasant activity drives out ;" ;~!:;'V::~he other activity') whereas "when an activity causes , ( ,1~~~i;j'pain, this pain destroys it» (Nicomachean Ethics, X, t :~ilg\{;~stead, he elevated the significance of pleasure that ;~;~~~l;t~~~~,specifically connected with the intellectual life: i:(~W~~~~',~:~or, while there is pleasure in respect of any sense, ::~~KV:ind in respect of thought and contemplation no / (' ,triflft~, the most complete is pleasantest, and that of a : t~~j~~dl-conditioned organ in relation to the worthiest :"j; ;t~1~;qf its objects is the most complete; and the plea-:; \~~ts,'~'re completes the activity" (Nicomachean Ethics, Q:,K~1X{1174b) 20-23). Thus in Aristotle's view, not all i}~~~p!easures have the same value; the value of pleasurẽ ! : ; t~14g.~pends on the value of the activity from which thẽ !\t~~gJ,easure arises.
; ~~; held that the goal~:~;
: :~i9fhuman life is pleasure. He called pleasure both being fearless in the face of death. All these, according to Epicurus, contribute to the highly desirable state of "rest." This concept refers to serenity of the soul, the absence of trouble and unrest of the psyche, and should not be confused with inactivity or indolence of the body. The antitheses to this concept of rest are the ideas of "motion" and "activity,') but again these do not refer to the movement of the body but rather to a state of debauchery and consumerism. According to Epicurus, "peace of mind and freedom from pain are pleasures which imply a state of rest; joy and delight are seen to consist in motion and activity" (Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, X, 136). Thus pleasure does not mean sensual enjoyment but freedom from pain in the body and from trouble in the mind (Lives of Eminent Philosophers, X, 131-132). Epicurus also disagreed with the Cyrenaics in that he believed the "pains of the mind" to be worse than the "pains of the body') because "the flesh endures the storms of the present alone, the mind those of the past and future as well as the present" (Lives of Eminent Philosophers, X, 137). During the Middle Ages, hedonism was rejected as incompatible with Christian values. The humanistic scholars were those who revisited the idea of hedonism. Erasmus Rene Descartes , as a rationalist, did not accept the version of hedonism according to which pleasure is the most important element in human life. Descartes was, of course, a dualist who believed not only that mind and body are distinct entities but also that one (the mind) must have commanding control over the other (the body). He held that pleasure and pain, as well as what he characterized as "passions" (what would be referred to as "emotions" today), are caused by the flow of animal spirits in the body. They can intrude into and disrupt the function of the ethereal mind, in what Descartes acknowledged as perhaps the main threat to his concept of substance dualism. Nevertheless, despite these intrusions and disruptions, Descartes adopted the position of the Stoics that the mind must exert control over passions and desires. In his words, "what we call 'titillation' or 'pleasurable sensation' occurs when the objects of the senses produce some movement in the nerves which would be capable of harming them if they did not have enough strength to resist it or if the body was not in a healthy condition" (The Passions of the Soul, 94/399, trans. 1985) .
Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) adopted a hedonistic approach to human motivation. In his view, human behavior is directed by self-interest and self-protection. Hobbes held that humans are thus stimulated by appetites, which bring forth a movement toward an object, and aversions, which induce a movement away from an object: "And in animal motion this is the very first endeavor, and found even in the embryo; which whl1e it is in the womb, rnoveth David Hurne (1711-1776) also adopted the basic hedonistic doctrine: "Tis obvious, that when we have the prospect of pain or pleasure from any object, we feel a consequent emotion of aversion or propensity, and are carry'd to avoid or embrace what will give us this uneasiness or satisfaction" (Hurne, 1740 (Hurne, /1978 . Hume proposed a division of passions into "direct" (e.g., desire, aversion, grief, joy, hope, fear, despair, and security) and "indirect"
. (e.g., pride, humility, ambition, vanity, love, hatred, envy, pity, malice, generosity, and their variants).
The direct passions "arise immediately from good or evil, from pain or pleasure," whereas the i d' .~~·~~~What "pleasure, and freedom from pain, are the only 1~<;f~ingsdesirable as ends; and that all desirable things ,,~'~;:Y~:~';,~are desirable either for the pleasure inherent in ,~f{@fhemselves, or as means to the promotion of pleaf(~;:~_~re and the prevention of pain" (Utilitarianism,~t ;;'~',Q~apter II). He countered the opinions of thosẽ~l i~ho had taken hedonism to be a "doctrine worthy f~:i'~?rly of swine" by emphasizing that there are qual-:~}~{~}t~tive differences berween pleasures, with those 1i~~f:eleasures that involve distinctively human faculties, t~f~I~.~ch as the intellect, the feelings, the imagination, '~}iM:.~d the moral sentiments, being superior to others~j~f (West, 2004) . ,~~~:jt.: Herbert Spencer's (1820 -1903 (Spencer, 1905, p. 
279).
Evolution linked pleasure to approach and pain to avoidance, and consequently "it is undeniable that every animal habitually persists in each act which gives pleasure, so long as it is does so, and desists from each act which gives pain" (p. 280). These links must be reliable and powerful. Any creature that departs from this cardinal rule becomes extinct: "if the states of consciousness which a creature endeavors to maintain are the correlatives of injurious actions, and if the states of consciousness which it endeavors to expel are the correlatives ofbeneficial actions, it must quickly disappear" (p, 280). Thus "conduct conducive to life" can only be the' conduct "that is conducive to a surplus of pleasures over pains" (Spencer, 1879, p. 45) .
Alexander Bain (1818 Bain ( -1903 ) endorsed
Spencer's views on the function of pleasure and pain in evolution: "states of pleasure are connected with an increase, states of pain with an abatement, of some, or all, of the vital functions" (Bain, 1879, p. 283) . Interestingly, throughout his work, Bain used "the pleasure of heal thy exercise" and "the pain of fatigue" to illustrate his points. Thus immediately after the aforementioned excerpt, he wrote: "it is known that exercise is pleasurable only when we are expending surplus energy, and [hereby making the blood to course through the system more rapidly. ... Let the stage of fatigue) however, be reached, and . let the spur to exertion be still continued, we then witness the concurring circumstances of the sense of pain) and the lowering of vital energy" (p. 283).
In turn, the "increase in vital power," according to Bain, must be one of the reasons for the "love of. exercise for its own sake, or apart from the ends of productive industry, and the preservation of health"
(p, 81). Bain also echoed the basic premise of psychological hedonism, linking pleasure to the pursuit and displeasure to the avoidance of action: "when movement concurs with pain, the pain arrests the movement through irs general depressing agency; as, on the, other hand, a movement bringing pleasure is sustained and promoted through the connection between pleasure and exalted energy" (p. 302 (Freud, 1911 (Freud, /1946 . Skinner (1904 for example, the proper subject matter of the study of emotion consists of (a) the emotional behavior and (b) the conditions that precipitated the behavior. It is indeeda testament to the robustness of hedonistic principles that they survived (of course, described in different terms) even in this environment. Specifically.
among several laws theorized to govern me process of learning, Edward Lee Thorndike (1874 -1949 proposed the so-called law of effect. Consistent with hedonistic ideas, this law suggests that when a behavior is paired with pleasure it becomes more likely to be repeated, whereas if it is paired with dis.. , pleasure it becomes more likely to be avoided: l'~af several responses made to the same situation, those which are accompanied or closely followed bysaris" faction to the animal will, other things being equal, be more firmly connected with the situation, sochar, when it recurs, they will be more likely to recun those which are accompanied or closely followed by I f f' t I example, James (1890b) referred to some of Bains positions as the "silliness of the old-fashioned plea- He went on to say that "surely it is obvious that men do often carry through a line of action which is [0 them painful in every phase, in the contemplation of it) in deciding upon it, and in its execution and achievement!" (p. 374). Another problem was the claim in the writings of some ardent proponents of hedonism, such as Bain, that the pursuit of (proximal or distal) pleasure and the avoidance of (proximal or distal) displeasure was the motive behind ali human action. Considering how absolute this claim was, it is not surprising that it was targeted by skeptics. James (1890b), for example, wrote: "Who smiles for the pleasure of the smiling, or frowns for the pleasure of the frown? Who blushes to escape the discomfort of not blushing? Or who in anger, grie£ or fear is actuated to the movements which he makes by the pleasures which they yield?" (p. 550). N evertheless, the fundamental tenets of motivational hedonism have remained unscathed. There have not been serious attacks against the core idea that pleasure is generally associated with beneficial courses of action, whereas displeasure is typically associated with harm. Furthermore, there is little resistance to the notion that human beings, in most cases, rend to repeat behaviors associated with pleasure and tend to avoid behaviors linked to displeasure. James Mark Baldwin (1891), for example, argued that "this fact, thatlour most abstract acts of volition are strongly influenced by subconscious affective conditions, is only beginning to have the recognition it deserves" (p, 320) and acknowledged that "ir is probable that we make no deliberate decisions whatever in which our own happiness has not been a factor of influence" (p. 327). McDougall (1916) , one of the most vocal opponents of psychological hedonism, accepted that "pleasure [tends] to sustain and prolong any mode of action, pain to cut it short" (p. 43). As for the tendency to "seek pleasure and ... try to avoid pain," McDougall characterized this as an "undeniable fact" (p. 364). Thus,
r , , . t : ' . " : . : . _ ·, [ , _ : ' . , : . : , ' . · , . : . : ; d · · "scomfart to the animal will, other things being
.~I}~P:~::~4ual, have their connec~ions with mat .situation !1~;:HCweakened, so that, when it recurs, they will be less ;l'~.~;~~i·~;;":']-'~k'ely to occur. The greater the satisfaction or dis-.,t.: .~,~:" J J.W:;;:.~brnfort, the greater the strengthening or weakening _:;f;:::;~~\rifthe bond" (Thorndike, 1911, p. 244 
Hedonistic Ideas and Exercise Behavior
The idea that exercise must be pleasant or else it is unlikely to be continued was promoted by Robert Roberts, a director of a Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA) gymnasium in Boston in the late 1800s and one of the pioneers of the physical training. movement. According to what became known as Roberts's "platform," all exercises should be "safe, short, easy, beneficial, and pleasing" to keep the exercisers corning back (Leonard, 1915, p. 124 Similarly, Pollock, Wilmore, and Fox (1978) wrote that exercise programs should "meet the criteria for improving and maintaining a sufficient level of physical fitness') but must also be "enjoyable," "rewarding to the participant," and "preferably ... fun" (pp. 121-122). The reason is that "people participate in programs [hey enjoy" (Pollock, 1978, p. 59) . Dishman, Sallis, and Orenstein (1985) noted that "feelings of enjoyment and well-being seem to be stronger motives for continued participation" than "knowledge of and belief in the health benefits of physical activity)' (p. 162), as well as "more important to maintaining activity than cancer about health" (p. 166). Later, Dishman (1990) It is again interesting to note that authors in interdisciplinary fields outside exercise psychology, especially those with close ties between research and practice, have been more active in promoc.. ing the idea of an affect-behavior connection than authors within exercise psychology. For example, in cardiac rehabilitation) exercise leaders are urged to pay close attention to such factors as "anxieties from the fear of overexertion causing an event, and attaining enjoyment from the exercise." Otherwise, "the required longer-term changes of behavior for maintaining physical activity at appropriate levels are less likely" (Buckley, 2006) p. 48) . Similarly, in physical therapy, researchers and practitioners have noted that patients with chronic pain and fatigue tend to develop a fear of physical movement our of concerns that their symptoms might be exacerbated or their injury might reoccur. This fear, termed "kinesiophobia," has been found to be negatively associated with physical activity and positively asso" ciated with self-rated disability (Elfving, Andersson, & Grooten, 2007; Nijs, De Meirleir, & Duque£, 2004 ).
x.. physical activity with descriptors like "happy;" "joy,>' or "delighted" as opposed to "sad," "sorrow," or "annoyed") nor only directly accounted for significant portions ofthe variance in self-reported physical activity but also mediated the links between cognitive variables (e.g., anticipated benefits and barriers, cognitive attitudes, perceived behavioral control) and physical activity (Kivinlemi, Voss-Humke,~,. Seifert, 2007) . In a study using a priming paradigm to assess automatic evaluations of exercise stimuli (e.g., "athletic" versus "exhausted"), physically active participants responded significantlyfaster to positive words after exercise primes, whereas inactive participants responded more rapidly to negative words (Bluemke, Brand, Schweizer, & Kahlert, 2010) . In another study, the affective component of attitude (rating physical activity and exercise as "enjoyable" versus "not enjoyable") showed much stronger relations (in fact, in most cases, at least twice as strong)
with the self-reported frequency of physical activity and exercise a month later than the cognitive component of attitude (rating physical activity and exercise as "beneficial" versus "harmful") (Lawton, Conner, & McEachan, 2009 ). Another recent study showed that the anticipation of positive (but not negative) affective responses stemming from "successfully engaging in regular physical activity» for 90 days (Le., "delighted," "happy," "fulfilled," "calm," "relaxed," or "at ease") was associated with a greater "likelihood of initiating physical activity for those participants who were inactive and a greater likelihood of continuing participation for those who were already active (Fridlund Dunton & Vaughan, 2008) . In a sample of 389 women between the ages of 18 and 68 years, self-reported physical activity was significantly related to the self-conscious ernodons of body-related pride (r =.27) and shame (r = -.23), as well as shame-free guilt (r =.32) and guilt-free shame (r = -.39) (Sabiston et al., 2010) .
In children between the ages of 8 and 12 years, the combination of ratings of "liking" (on a visual' analog scale ranging from "don't like at all" to "like very much") and evidence of the relative rewarding value of physical activity (i.e., willingness to press a button to obtain access to one's favorite physical activity as opposed to watching a cartoon) was a significant predictor of minutes spent in moderate-to-vigorous physical activity (assessed by accelerometry) during a week (Roemmich et al., 2008) . In a sample of psychiatric patients, those who endorsed the statement "exercise gives me pleasure" were 21 times more likely to exercise than those who answered negatively (Sorensen, 2006) .
Overall, the inattention to affect as a motivational force in exercise behavior cannot be attributed to a lack of relevant clues in the literature. If one cares to look, the clues are present. If they have not been more widely noticed, this is probably due to the fact that exercise psychology, under the cognitivisr paradigm, seems to have become "increasingly rigid" (Kuhn, /1996 . In other words, the clues have been missed because findings attributing a powerful role to affective influences on behavior simply fall outside the scope of the dominant paradigm of the past decades.
Stumbling Blocks 'When a paradigm ascends to the status of "normal science," it starts to dictate an "orthodox" way of thinking that transcends a broad range of domains of academic life) from what is publishable or fundable to what is worth teaching in undergraduate and postgraduate curricula. As more and more generations of students are indoctrinated within an academic culture that endorses the assumption of rationality and models of human behavior based entirely on information 'processing) alternative or complementary perspectives become marginalized, rejected, or eventually eradicated from the "mainstream" literature. A reflection of this process) as noted earlier,"is that most contemporary textbooks in exercise psychology contain nothing on the role of affect in exercise behavior.
Consequently, graduates of exercise science programs have no knowledge about the importance of affect in shaping decisions about exercise and, more importantly, have not been taught how to optimize the affective experiences derived from exercise participation, with the goal of improving long-term adherence to improve the chances of long-term adherence. Instead, they are instructed only to pro. . . vide information about the benefits associated with exercise participation (e.g., weight loss outcomes) and to boost self-perceptions that are considered relevant (e.g., self-efficacy), along with a few behavioral techniques (e.g., placement of behavioral prompts at points of decision). References to the role of affect in exercise behavior are absent from almost all major recent reviews on mediators of exercise initiation and maintenance, such as the reports of the Task Force on Community Preventive Services (Kahn er al., 2002) and the American Heart Association Council on-Nutrition, Physical Activity, and Metabolism (Marcus et al., 2006) , as well as from recently proposed theoretical models that focus specifically on exercise behavior (e.g., Nigg, Borrelli, Maddock, & D"ishman) 2008. Schwarzer, 2008) . \ The marginalization of a potential mechanism' the literature, along with the promotion of thent In Stones, Kozma, & Stones, 1987; Wankel, 1985 Wankel, , 1993 . Thus according to a review of factors rhar mediate physical activity behavior change, "past research provides no support that enjoyment is a mediator of physical activity" (Lewis, Marcus, Pare, & Dunn, 2002, p. 32) . The basis for this conclusion was that intervention studies in which enjoyment was examined as a possible mediator of physical activity behavior change showed that enjoymem did not improve as a result of the intervention, regardless of whether physical activity increasedor Researchers in recent years have started to place the exercise-affect connection under a new, more critical light. Reexamining this issue has necessitated an overhaul of the conceptual and methodological approach on which previous studies were based. The fundamental assumption behind the new approach was that the exercise-affect relationship is more intricate and multifaceted than -just the "feel better" effect. This includes the possibility that some individuals may not feel better when they exercise and that some may even feel worse. As de Geus and de Moor (2008) put it, "we need to reach out to these people through other means than just repeating over and over that 'exercise will make you feel better") Cp. 58).
The first step was to rebuild the methodological platform to ensure that any nonpositive affective changes would not escape detection (Backhouse, Ekkekakls, Biddle, Foskett, & Williams, 2007; Ekkekakis, Parfitt, & Petruzzello, 2011; Ekkekakis & Petruzzello, 1999) . This required (a) implementing a measurement approach that encom... passes negative in addition to positive affective states, (b) tracking affective changes throughout the entire exercise episode, including the duration of the exercise bout itself: as well as the recovery period, (c) increasing statistical power by reducing error variance due to incomplete standardization of exercise intensity across participants, and (d) examining changes at the level of individuals and subgroups rather than exclusively at the level of group means.
The second step was to develop a new, broad theoretical framework that goes beyond the "feel better" effect and acknowledges the possibility of negative effects and individual variability, makes testable predictions about dose-response patterns, and postulates a specific mechanistic basis. This new framework has been named the dual-mode theory (Ekkekakis, 2003 (Ekkekakis, , 2005 (Ekkekakis, , 2009a Ekkekakis & Acevedo, 2006; Ekkekakis, Hall, & Petruzzello, 2005b) . From the perspective of this theory, affective responses to exercise are considered evolutionary adaptations, shaped through natural selection to promote Darwinian fitness within the specific context of exercise. The theory postulates that affective responses to exercise are determined by the continuous interplay berween two factors, namely "top-down" cognitive parameters (e.g., appraisals of physical self-efficacy and self...presentational concerns) and "bottom-up" interoceptive cues (e.g., signals from chemoreceptors, baroreceptors, 
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EKKEKAKIS, DAFERMOS ...j 3 11 therrnoreceptors, rnechanoreceptors, and various visceroceptors in the heart, lungs, and internal organs). The relative importance of these two factors is theorized to change systematically as a function of exercise intensity. Specifically, cognitive factors are expected to be the dominant determinants of affect at intensities below and (mainly) near the ventilatory or lactate threshold (VTILT), where the intensity begins to pose a challenge. On the other hand, interoceptive cues will gain greater salience .
at intensities that significantly exceed the VTILT and a physiological steady state becomes difficult or impossible to maintain.
Within the framework of the dual-mode theory) affective responses to different levels of exercise intensity must be meaningfully linked to me adaprational outcomes associated with these intensities.
Specifically, exercise performed at a level of intensity below the VT/LT can be sustained for a long time without causing major homeostatic perturbations and without threatening general health and wellbeing (assuming a healthy organism). Moreover, given the ability to carry out such activity for prolonged periods, it is reasonable to conclude that this is probably the level of physical exertion that was most common in ancestral environments characterized by hunting and gathering activities occupying large parts of daily life. Since these subsistence activities directly affected survival and the ability [0 find mates and raise viable children (i.e., the two components of Darwinian fitness), it is reasonable to suggest that a mechanism might have evolved to promote or reward such activities. The most likely candidate for providing such a reward is pleasure (Cabanac, 1992 (Cabanac, , 2002 (Cabanac, , 2006 (Cabanac, , 2010 Panksepp, 1998) . This is not an implausible argument, since it is readily accepted in regard to the pleasure that accompanies other human activities of significant adaprational value, such as eating appetizing food when hungry, drinking fresh water when thirsty, or engaging in sexual relationships (e.g., Berridge & Kringelbach, 2008; Denton, McKinley, Farrell, & Eagan, 2009 ). Thus the dual-mode theory predicts that exercise intensities below the V'TILT should be associated with increases in pleasure among the majority of participants.
Consistent with this prediction, exercise bouts performed below the VTILT have been shown to improve 'affecr at the level of entire groups (e.g., Bixby, Spalding, & Hatfield, 2001) or at least within subgroups (e.g., Ekkekakis, Hall, & Petruzzello, 2008; Parfitt, Rose, & Burgess, 2006; Rose & Parfitt, 2007) . Especially when walking at a self-selected pace, most individuals tend to report increas ' . es 10' pleasure and energy (Ekkekakis, 2009<:;  An exception to this general trend is seen when the individuals involved in exercise are chronically inactive, obese, or both (e.g., Ekkekakis, Lind, & Vazou, 2010; Sheppard & Parfitt, 2008; Welch. Hulley, Ferguson, & Beauchamp, 2007) . These physical and lifestyle characteristics render such individuals evolutionary rarities, but unfortunately they now represent the majority of the population in industrialized countries. Among such samples, a decline in pleasure is found even when the intensity is below the VTILT. Both physical and cognitive mechanisms may account for this finding. Physically, the performance of a body long subjected to sedentary living and further burdened by excess adiposiry may be limited by factors besides the cardiorespiratory system. These may include joint stiffness, muscle atrophy; knee and backaches, or ineffective thermoregulation. Likewise) these individuals may cognitively appraise the exercise stimulus in conjunction with the exercise context as posing an evaluative threat. Individuals who are out of shape, overweight" or both are usually aware of their physical condition and appearance, especially in comparison with idealized normative standards. Thus they may feel apprehensive when placed in a situation in which their poor state is likely to be noticed and criticized by others (e.g., in a crowded gymnasium or during an exercise test in a laboratory). These physical and cognitive mechanisms may influence affective responses throughout the entire range of exercise intensity, including below the VT/LT.
When the intensity of physical activity reaches the VTILT, it starts to pose a substantial physiological challenge to most individuals, regardless of their physical condition. Displeasure is the vehicle -by which significant physiological perturbations enter conscious awareness (Cabanac, 2006 (~~,:.& Gross, 2007; Ochsner & Gross, 2005 ;)l~~!guous role in adapt~tion, including the possibility '~~!~~:~~~ifW~t the response entails a trade-off between benefits~~; i:~a nd risks. In the case of exercise, the ability to control negative affect in the presence of a homeostatic perturbation probably entails such a trade-off. On the one hand, being able to do more work (e.g., cover more ground in pursuit of prey) or being able to continue working under environmentally adverse conditions yields an evolutionary advantage; one is more likely to be a reliable provider of nourishment for oneself, one's mate, and one's progeny. On the other hand, consistently "pushing the envelope" by bringing the organism close to its biological limits is tantamount to challenging one's fate. Given the low tolerance of many physiological systems to deviations from normalcy (e.g., hyper-or hypothermia, metabolic acidosis, or myocardial or cerebrovascular ischemia), operating near the limit raises the risk of sudden death or an incapacitating injury. Therefore, on balance, the ability to regulate the negative affective response to exercise at intensities proximal to the VTILT is probably neither consistently advantageous nor consistently harmful.
Consistent with theoretical predictions, affective changes at intensities proximal to the VTILT have been shown to be highly variable (Ekkekakis er al., 2005b; Ekkekakis, Hall, & Petruzzello, 2008; Parfitt et al., 2006; Rose & Parfitt, 2007; Welch et al., 2007) . Self-reported individual differences in preference for and tolerance of exercise intensity have been found to account for approximately 20-250/0 of the variance in ratings of pleasure vs. displeasure during exercise performed at the VT (Ekkekakls et al., 2005a) . Similarly, individual differences in situational appraisals of exercise self-efficacy have been found to account for approximately 20-300/0 of the variance in affective valence at this intensity (Ekkekakis, 2003) .
When exercise intensity substantially exceeds the VTILT and a physiological steady state can no longer be maintained, the adaptational implications are unambiguous: This level of exercise intensity is not only unsustainable but also risky. Exercise must soon stop or the intensity must be reduced to avoid collapse, a system-wide bioenergetic crisis, and possibly irreparable harm. For this to happen, the affective directive to consciousness must be intense, immediate, unequivocal, and irrepressible. Much like intense pain, a strong negative affective response to strenuous exercise has evolved [0 act as a lifesaver, a fail-safe mechanism that protects the health and long-term well-being of the individual by causing an immediate behavioral withdrawal from the precipitating stimulus. Thus the dual-mode theory predicts a universal decline in pleasure when exercise intensity exceeds the VTILT and precludes the maintenance of a physiological steady state.
Consistent with this prediction, there is compelling evidence of declines in pleasure above the VTI LT (Bixby et al., 2001; Bixby & Lochbaurn, 2006; Ekkekakis, Hall, & Petruzzello, 2008; Kilpatrick Kraemer, Bartholomew, Acevedo, & Jarreau, 2007; Rose & Parfitt, 2007; Sheppard & Parfitt, 2008) . Such declines are reported by all or nearly all individuals. Moreover, at such intensities reports of affective valence develop strong negative correlations with markers of physiological strain such as oxygen uptake, level of lactate accumulation, and the respiratory exchange ratio (e.g., Acevedo, Kraemer, Haltom, & Tryniecki, 2003; Acevedo, Rinehardt, & Kraemer, 1994; Ekkekakis, 2003; Hardy & Rejeski, 1989) . These findings suggest a transition to a mode of affect generation in which affective responses become a direct reflection of the perturbed internal environment. As the dual-mode theory predicts, the interoceptive cues evidently become the dominant determinants of the affective state.
Initially it was believed that this might happen as a result of the intensification of these interoceptive cues at supra-VT/LT intensities (Ekkekakis & Acevedo, 2006) . For example, as ventilation becomes deeper and more frequent, core remperature rises, and the muscles become more acidic, the corresponding afferent cues might simply overpower the top-down prefrontal control over the affective centers of the brain. More recently, however, an additional possibili ry emerged. In neuroimaging studies, it was observed that "when humans have strong affective experiences, higher cortical regions tend to shut down" (Panksepp & Panksepp, 2000, p. 115) . In both acute (e.g., induction of transient emotions by various experimental manipulations) and chronic paradigms (e.g., depressed patients or individuals suffering from posttraumatic stress), various subdivisions of the prefrontal cortex (often bilaterally) show reduced metabolic activity, usually in conjunction with increased activity in the amygdala (Quirk & Beef, 2006) . Although neuroimaging during vigorous exercise with a method that provides good temporal and spatial resolution, such as functional magnetic resonance, remains technically unfeasible, approximately 30 studies using near-infrared spectroscopy of the prefrontal cortex have shown an increase in oxygenation with low-tomoderate levels of exercise intensity but a decrease with high exercise intensity, particularly beyond the respiratory compensation point (see Ekkekakis, 2009b , for a review). These findings suggest that the intensification of the bodily signals at intensl" , tIcs above the VT/LT might not be the only mechanis that precipitates the "switch" to a mode of affe lll induction in which interoceptive cues become t~t dominant determinants. A complementary mechañ ism might consist of a transient hypometabolis in the prefrontal cortex, the main neural substra: for the regulation of negative affect. The existence of such a mechanism would make adaptational sense inasmuch as the mediation or control of affect bI cognition could introduce distortions in the rei;' tionship between the homeostatic perturbation and the negative affective response. The vital impOrtance of this mechanism can be appreciated if one consid_ ers what would happen ifit did not exist: The "effec_ rive" use ofa cognitive coping technique, iftaken to extremes, would result in death.
If this mechanism is confirmed, it could have important practical implications. It would mean that an exerciser's capacity to cognitively modih is or her affective response during exercise above the VT/LT would be diminished, regardless of the level of experience in using cognitive techniques. For example, an exerciser might be taught to cognitively reframe (reappraise) the unpleasant affective responses as signs of a body that is getting stronger) to counter the negative affect with a bolstered appraisal of efficacy, or to divert his or her attention away from the unpleasant bodily sensations and toward a distracting external stimulus (e.g., a music or television program). These interventions, all cognitive in nature (i.e., manipulating the input and interpretation of information relevant to rhe affective state), might maintain their eff.ectiveness in influencing the affective response only up [0 rhe level of exercise intensity that precipitates a decline in prefrontal oxygenation. The few studies that have examined the role of exercise intensity in the effectiveness of cognitive techniques in influencing subjective responses to exercise support this notion (sec Lind, Welch, & Ekkekakis, 2009 , for a review).
In closing this section, it is important to underscore that exercise intensity is certainly nor (he only variable that can influence affective responses. Researchhas uncovered a multitude of additional variables that play a role, including the sense of efficacy (e.g., Jerome et al. 
~~?
7::' :"-:>SOlI1e Realistic Examples to Bring ;:~~>::.1hings into Perspective ¥:r':,;': ," When discussing vigorous or strenuous exercise, r;~::t'~ne might tend to visualize Olympic-caliber ath- ,:~~n!:)~g leaves. As these examples illustrate, for many l~}!(;:,(perhaps most) sedentary middle-aged or older rt%:;R~ildividuals,a level of exercise intensity that exceeds :1i~~~)t~he VT/LT corresponds to nothing more than com-:\:I~\~l~\'pon everyday tasks and is certainly far from any-::rJ~~~:~lng involving herculean effort. fWD:~>' According to the results of recent studies on ,,;~~;.~tihe exercise-affect link, the woman in the exam-~\ ple would not only feel worse~hile performing añ t1i~:~~tivity as seemingly innocuous as raking and sack-,~~~~:\~g leaves (Ekkekakis er al., 2010) but might also be I~J,:~,~able to cognitively control this negative affectivẽ~X~ § fsponse. While it seems reasonable to publicly pro-:i~~~~5~a.im that physical activity should be "enjoyable»~j :f~be maintained, exercise scientists are only now , beginning to come to terms with the magnitude of the challenge inherent in making this proclamation a reality for the majority of sedentary adults.
Most exercise guidelines still appear strangely oblivious to this challenge. For example) according to the data from the 2000 Behavioral Risk Factor Surveillance System, no more than 3.00/0 of obese women and 6.40/0 of obese men trying to lose weight report engaging in physical activity of at least 60 minutes daily (which is what current guidelines recommend) in addition to restricting their caloric intake (Bish er al., 2005) . One might start to wonder about the true public health relevance of a recommendation that almost no one seems willing (or able) to follow.
Perhaps the following data might provide an indication of the magnitude of the challenge faced by exercise practinioners. The American College of Sports Medicine (2010) recommends that the initial intensity of activity for obese adults be no more than 40-600/0 of maximal oxygen uptake reserve. Over time, obese adults are encouraged [0 exercise for 60-90 minutes. While designing a study to investigate the affective responses of sedentary obese women, Ekkekakis and colleagues (2010) needed to identify a level of treadmill speed that would be appropriate as a warm-up. According to previous studies by Browning and Kram (2005) had already reached 61 % of their maximal aerobic capacity after walking at this speed for only 2 minutes. These results are not unique. The 55 obese women tested by Mattsson, Larsson, and Rossner (1997) , who were more physically active and fit than the women in the study by Ekkekakis et al.
(2010), approached the upper limit of the recommended intensity range (560/0 V0 2 m ax) after walking at a self-selected "comfortable" speed (1.18 ttils, or 2.65 mph) for only 4 minutes. Therefore, at least while performing weight-bearing activities such as walking, obese women seem unable to maintain a physiological steady state within the recommended range of 40-60% of maximal oxygen uptake reserve. Even within 2-4 minutes, the intensity will probably exceed 60% and, in all likelihood) the VI:
Thus it is perhaps unsurprising that obese women report no increase in pleasure in response to exercise EKKEKAKIS, DAFERMOS (Ekkekakis et al., 2010) or that they are highly unlikely to satisfy the current recommendation of 60 minutes of daily moderate-intensity physical activity (Bish et al., 2005) .
Are Affective Responses Related to
Subsequent Physical Activity Behavior, In previous sections, it was shown that (a) exercise, depending on irs intensity, can reduce pleasure and (b) different individuals exhibit different affective changes in response to exercise. It is important to reiterate that these are recent findings. Before the last decade or so, neither the variability of affective responses nor the fact that people can feel worse during (intense) exercise had been demonstrated reliably (Van Landuyt, Ekkekakis, Hall, & Petruzzello, 2000) . Both of these elements are crucial, because if the only effect 0 f exercise were to increase pleasure and if this effect were shared by all) or nearly all, people, then there would be no reason to examine whether affective responses could account for behavioral variance. So these recent findings have laid the foundation for the examination of the role of affective responses in subsequent physical activity and exercise behavior.
The implications of the "feel worse" effect documented by several of the studies reviewed above should be considered in the context of the observation that what seems to determine whether an activity registers in memory as pleasant or unpleasant is not necessarily the absolute level of pleasure but rather "the change (for better or worse) that it represents, and how it compares with alternative outcomes" (Yarey & Kahnernan, 1992, p. 179) , such as those associated with sedentary behaviors. In other words, if an exercise bout makes people feel worse (less pleasure) than they did before the bout (even if they do not rate "theaffect during exercise as "bad") or if exercise makes people feel less pleasure than alternative options (e.g., watching television or playing video games), this suffices to reduce the likelihood of exercise being their preferred behavioral option.
With evidence ofvariability in affective responses to exercise, incl uding a "feel worse" effect, investigating whether affective responses to exercise are related to exercise participation seems fully warranted. As shown in Table 16 .1, this question has so far been addressed in 11 known studies. While studies conducted in recent years have tended to be more conceptually and methodologically sophisticated than those conducted in the 1990s, it is clear that this line of research is still developing and is still exploring the best avenues for accomplishin its goaL For example, in some studies affect w. g assessed in terms of a few distinct states, Where: in others it was assessed in terms of broad dirnens ions. In some studies the intensity <:5f"exerdse Was determined by perceptions of exertion, in others as a percentage of maximal capacity, and in others in relation to the VT. In some studies physical activ_ ity was defined by the number of gymnasium visits (i.e., session attendance), whereas in others it was (s defined as total free-living activity. Of the studies in the latter category, in some cases activity Was assessed by a standardized questionnaire or interview, in others by nonvalidared rating scales, and in others byaccelerometry. So clearly the standards o] "best practice" are still evolving.
It is also important to point our that all the studies in this area have been correlational (although, to their credit, most have been prospective rather than cross-sectional). Given how little is known abo ur possible methods of improving affective responses to exercise, especially among high-risk groups such as individuals who are sedentary, obese, or in less than perfect health, it is perhaps not surprising that no studies so far have attempted any experimental manipulations of the affective responses with the purpose of assessing their mediational effects on physical activity participation, exercise adherence, or dropout. Perhaps the most obvious candidate for such a manipulation would be the intensity of exercise, since more information is available abour this independent variable than any other (Ekkekakis et al., 2011) .
The 11 studies summarized in Table 16 .1 provide preliminary support for a link between affective responses and exercise behavior. Most notably, the most recent studies, which incorporated several conceptual and methodological innovations, all found evidence of statistically significant associations between affective responses and measures of exercise behavior (Kwan & Bryan, 2010; Schneider, Dunn, & Cooper, 2009; Williams et at 2008) . The common characteristic of these recent studies is that they all included assessments of affect during the exercise bouts. Although the treatmen£ of these data differed among studies (i.e., as absolute scores, as changes from baseline, or as individ.. uallinear slopes over time), as did the measures of affect that were used (i.e., a single-item rating scale of pleasure-displeasure or a multi-item quesdo nnaire), these studies support the idea that affecrivc responses during exercise are more variable and perhaps more closely linked to decisions regarding However, for participants with medium self-motivation, the correlations were nonsignificant, and for those with high self-motivation, the correlations were in the opposite direction. Change scores in EFI subscales accounted for less than 1% of the variance in attendance but the interactions with self-motivation were significant (R 2 =.23 for Positive Engagement; .22 for Revitalization; .20 for Tranquility; .27 for Physical Exhaustion).
Attendance ranged from 170/0 to 1000/0. Changes in EFI scores from before to after six sessions (one every 3 weeks) were averaged for each participant. Participants were then classified as showing a positive Only the Revitalization and Physical Exhaustion subscales of the EFI were included. Changes from before to after 6 exercise sessions (weeks I, 3, 5, 7, 9 , and 11) were averaged for each participant. 
STAI
Among women who completed the program, the intervention did not alter the changes in the POMS factor scores from before to after a graded exercise test. These mood changes were also unrelated to the duration of the exercise tests or the changes in body mass, body mass index, percentage body fat, or exercise enjoyment. The 7 dropouts showed mood changes in opposite directions from those ofthe 25 cornplerers (increases in tension, depression, anger, fatigue, and confusion and a decrease in vigor; also, a larger increase in fatigue).
Students completed the POMS and STAI before and after workouts (swimming and yoga classes) on weeks 1, G, and 12. A mean change score was computed by subtracting postexercise from pre-exercise scores on the 6 POMS scales and STAI and adding the difference scores from the three assessments. Students attended 91 % of the classes. The scores of the six POMS subscales and STAI were used as predictors and the number of absences from class was used as the criterion in a multiple regression.
More positive changes significantly predicted fewer absences (R =.49). Before and after an initial aerobics class, the women were asked, "How happy are you?" and "How euphoric are you?" on 9-poinr rating scales ranging from "Not at all" to "Extremely,' Increases were reported on both scales (from 6.18 to 7.45 and from 4.38 to 6.31). Three classes were offered each weekday for 10 weeks (total of 123 possible sessions). Of these, the women attended on average 10.3
sessions (approximately 1 per week) but with great interindividual differences. Paradoxically, attending more sessions was associated with higher anxiety (.42), more reported physical symptoms (.56), and higher body weight (.52). Changes in happiness, euphoria, and the average of the two scales were unrelated to the number of exercise sessions attended. Similarly, blood levels of beta-endorphin and changes in these levels from before to after the initial exercise session were unrelated to attendance. Kwan & Bryan, 2010 129 nonsedentary, nonathletic adults (62 men, 67 women), mean age 22_4 years Baseline assessment and 3-month follow-up PAAS A measure of the frequency of physical activity was derived by standardizing and averaging the participants' reports of (a) how often they engaged in aerobic exercise in the past 3 months, (b) the average number of days per week they engaged in aerobic exercise in the past 3 months, and (c) how many days they engaged in aerobic exercise in the past week. The PAAS was administered at minutes 5, 10,20, and 30 of a 3D-min treadmill bout at 650/0 VO,max and minutes 15 and 30 of recovery. On average, the participants reported increases in positive aff~ct and decreases in negative affect, tranquility, and exhaustion during exercise. Post exercise, positive affect and tranquility increased, whereas negative affect and fatigue decreased. The participants reponed 3.83 days of aerobic exercise per week at baseline and 3.60 days at 3-month follow-up. Larger increases in positive affect and larger decreases in exhaustion during exercise were associated with more frequent aerobic exercise at follow-up (3% and 6% of the variance, respectively) after controlling for pre-exercise affect and baseline level ofvigorous physical activity. Similarly, more tranquility and less fatigue at minute 15 of recovery were related to more frequent aerobic exercise at follow-up (50/0 and 4% of the variance) respectivelr).
(Continued) 
Findings
The participants completed one 30-min cycle-ergometer ride at 800/0 of the ventilatory threshold (VT) and another at 500/0 of the distance between VT and V0 2 max. Physical activity was assessed by accelerometry over one week. For the participants who wore the accelerometers for at least 8 hours per day on at least 4 days, the proportion of days on which the participant did at least 60 min of moderateto-vigorous physical activity (MVPA) was calculated. Boys met this criterion on 32% of the days and girls on 17%. Changes 'in FS from baseline to the average of minutes 10 and 20 during exercise and to the average of minutes 0 and 10 of postexercise recovery were also calculated. The FS was administered every 2 min during a submaxima! treadmill protocol (up to 85% of agepredicted maximal heart rate). The first FS scores after the participants reached 64 % of age-predicted maximal heart rate were recorded; 27.0% reported an increase) 29.70/0 a decline, and 43.20/0 no change.
Only 31 participants completed assessments of physical activity (physical activity recall interview) at the 6-and 12-month follow-ups. FS scores during moderate intensity were significantly correlated with physical activity at the 6-month (.50) and 12-monm (.47) follow-ups. The relationships remained significant after controlling for baseline levels of physical activity and baseline FS. A I-unit increase in FS was associated with 38 additional minutes of at least moderate physical activity per week at the 6-month follow-up and 41 additional minutes per week at the 12-month follow-up.
I!i!~;:~~~;s~t exercise behavior than postexercisẽ Ij)~~:h:" For example, Schneider et al. (2009) reported ij~'~~'that during a 3D-minute bour of exercise at 80% is important to note that it shows significant overlap with affective responses to exercise (Focht, 2009; Mod, Berger, & Leuschen, 2000; Raedeke, 2007; Robbins, Pis, Pender, & Kazanis, 2004) .
Setting the Stage for a Hedonic Theory of Exercise Behavior
The central theme of this chapter is that the "affect heuristic" might be a powerful, albeit currendy underappreciated and underexploited, mechanism that shapes the decision to remain physically active or to drop out. .As more information accumulates on the influence of exercise on pleasure and displeasure, me basic idea of an affectbehavior link will have to be elaborated upon and developed into a formal, testable theory of exercise behavior. The main objective of this chapter was to set the stage for this advance. In conj unction with other recent works (Backhouse et al., 2007; Ekkekakis, Hall, & Petruzzello, 2008; Parfitt & Hughes, 2009; Williams, 2008) , the evidence discussed in the previous sections supports the development of a model of behavioral decision making that explicitly acknowledges and incorporates affective influences.
As suggested previously, perhaps the main reason for the inattention to the role of affect in theoretical efforts [0 predict and explain exercise behavior has been the dominating influence of the cognirivist zeitgeist. In a classic article, Loewenstein (1996) made a similar point. He argued that decisionmaking approaches based on the assumption of rationality fall short in the treatment of motivation and effort because they fail to take into account the impact of affective or visceral factors. In his words, such approaches make uno qualitative distinction between choosing, say one car over another, or 'deciding' to pick up one's pace in the last mile of a marathon; both are simply decisions" (p. 287). .As an example, he noted that because of the tendency to underestimate the power of affective influences, one might find it difficult to understand why Olympic speed skaters "fail to maintain their pace in the face of such overwhelming incentives" (p. 287). According to Loewenstein, "physical effort ... often produces an aversive sensation referred to as fatigue or, at higher levels, exhaustion. Like other visceral factors, fatigue and exhaustion are directly aversive and alter the desirability of different activities; most prominently, they decrease the desirability of further increments of effort" (p. 287). His conclusion was that "with all its cleverness ... decision theory is somewhat crippled emotionally, and thus detached from the emotional and visceral richness of life" (p, 289).
Although these might seem like compelling arguments, it is clear that considerable conceptual groundwork remains to be completed before a formal hedonic theory of exercise behavior can be proposed. Some of the key ideas are highlighted below.
Core Affect or Emotions?
When a participant reports that he or she "feels good" or "feels bad" when exercising, this "good' or "bad" feeling could reflect a response emanating from various levels along the hierarchically organized domain of affect. At the most basic level, which has been called "core affect" (Russell, 2003) , this could describe a primitive, automatic, and cognitively unmediated feeling of pleasure or displeasure. Examples of such pleasure include [he pure sense of energy and bodily exhilaration [hat accompanies a brisk walk, a bicycle ride, or a swim on a beautiful day. Examples of such displeasure include the feeling of struggle and distress when one is pushed to the limit of one's endurance capacity or the sense of complete energy drain after a tiring run in hot and humid conditions. These feelings have a distinctly affective character (are unmistakably pleasant or unpleasant, respectively), but they probably do not require an antecedent cognitive appraisal, nor can they be significantly altered by cognition. For example, a 1500-m runner can do very little to change the sense of tension and fatigue during the final lap, despite a genetic predisposition for high tolerance to fatigue. Likewise, a severely deconditioned obese exerciser cannot freely dissociate his or her attention away from (or cognitively reframe) his or her feeling of exhaustion halfway through an aerobics class.
At the other end of the affective spectrum, there are pleasant and unpleasant emotional states that are highly complex, intrinsically culture bound, cognitively induced, and cognitively modifiable. Examples of positive emotions include the contentment and personal satisfaction associated with reaching one's weight loss goal or the sense of pride and empowerment experienced by a formerly sedentary older person after being able to walk briskly for 30 minutes for the first time in many years.
Examples of negative emotions include the worry and embarrassment felt by someone with high social physique anxiety when exercising in a gymnasium, surrounded by mirrors and fit people in tight clothing, or the deep fear felt by a patient in cardiac rehabilitation when starting to exercise after a heart attack. In these cases, the positive or negative -":::~~'-; emotions follow directly from cognitive apprais.ais such as the realization that one has reached a p ) Pleasure is evidently a "go" signal, which guides the' organism to continue important activities such as foreplay or consuming sweet) energy-rich food. Pain is a "stop" signal) which interrupts activities that arc causing harm) such as placing weight on a wounded foot. The common characteristic of the basic forms of pleasure and distress is that they regulate the response to the current situation.
(p.379)
Similarly, episodes of pleasure and displeasure upon exposure to affect-inducing stimuli shape positive or negative memories of these events. In turn, these memories influence the decision on whether to approach or avoid. future encounters with these stimuli. According to I<ahneman et ale (1997) , Remembered utilities also have an adaptive function: they determine whether a situation experienced in the past should now be approached or avoided. Unlike pain and pleasure, which control behavior in the current situation, learned attractions and aversions adjust current behavior to the remembered evaluations of events in the past. Other authors have argued that the affecdvc impact of various activities should be assessed nor in terms of a single dimension (such as pleasuredispleasure) but rather in terms of specific emotions (Fredrickson, 2000; Lerner & I(eltner, 2000) . tJ992). These studies have revealed three important 't~!lp_rinciples that influence how the affective responses~~p erienced during an activity relate to the posi-:I~~ye or negative memories formed of that activity f~~;~·pd the likelihood of repeating the activity in the future. According to these principles, what has the largest impact on how an event registers in memory and influences future behavioral choices is the peak (positive or negative) affect experienced during the event (the so-called peak rule) and the affect experienced at the end (the so-called end rule). On the other hand, the duration of the experience seems inconsequential (a phenomenon called "duration ,.:-' neglect").
In an application ofthese ideas to exercise, Brewer, Manos, McDevitt, Cornelius, and Van Raalte (2000) found that respondents rated as less aversive a hypothetical bout of exercise that was described as 33% longer (20 minutes vs. 15 minutes) if it ended with a reduction in intensity (ratings of perceived exertion of 8, 13, 17, and l Lon the 6-20 scale at the 5th, l Oth, 15th, and 20th minutes, respectively, "(s. 8, 13 , and 17 at the 5th, l Oth, and 15th minutes). In a second study, the authors reported that an actual bout of exercise that was 20 minutes long but ended with reduced intensity (heart rate of 120, 140, 160, and 130 beats/min at the 5th, l Oth, 15th, and 20th minutes, respectively) was selected for repetition nearly twice as frequently (650/0 to 350/0) as a IS-minute bout that ended with high intensity (heart rate of 120, 140, and 160 beats/min at the 5th, l Orh, and l Sth minutes).
1he Conflict between Affect and Reason
Assuming that the role of affective constructs in shaping behavioral decisions is acknowledged, a larger and arguably even more challenging issue will be to delineate the relative contributions of affect and reason. Both seem important, but how do they interact? Theorists have proposed that the system responsible for judgment and reasoning is characterized by a dual-layer architecture (5. Epstein, 1994; Evans, 2003 Evans, , 2008 Kahnernan, 2003; Sloman, 1996; Stanovich & West, 2000) . The evolutionarily more primitive "System 1" is rapid, effortless, inflexible, and automatic. The outcomes of this system include instinctive responses that are innately programmed. For the most part, System 1 processes are theorized to be impervious to volitional control. System 1 relies heavily on affect, opting for choices that are positively laden and avoiding choices that are negatively laden. On the other hand, "System 2" is slower, more effortful, and flexible. Its major advantage compared with System 1 is that it allows abstract reasoning, future projections, hypothesis testing, and other executive processes. Its operations are typically under volitional control and therefore modifiable.
Authors have speculated that in some situations behavioral decisions are made following a conflict between System 1 and System 2 processes (Finucane et al., 2003; Stanovich & West, 2000; Svenson, 2003) . Such conflicts have been explored for smoking (Slavic, 2001 ) and food choice (Shiv & Fedorlkhin, 1999 ,2002 but not for exercise. However, in anecdotal accounts, many people describe their effort to maintain an exercise program as a "struggle" or an internal conflict, saying, for example, "I know I should be exercising, but ..." or "I wish I was taking better care of myself," What statements such as these seem to imply is that although most people are aware of the benefits associated with exercise and, within the bounds of human rationality, can probably infer the long-term negative consequences of sedentary behavior, their behavior is also subject to certain inhibitory or counteracting forces. Affectbased System 1 processes are a likely candidate for this role.
S. Epstein (1994) considered the affect-based experiential system to be the "default option" (p. 716), because it is less effortful and more efficient than the rationalsystem. Moreover, he argued that the affective nature of the experiential system itself makes it "more compelling than is dispassionate logical thinking" (p, 716). Finally, because the workings of the experiential system remain largely outside of conscious awareness, it is very difficult for the rational system to exert control over them.
Similar views have been expressed by authors investigating the causes of obesity, addictions, and other problems assumed to have an affective, experiential, or "visceral" component (Loewenstein, 1996 (Loewenstein, , 2001 Slovic, 2001; Slovic et al., 2007) . According to Slavic et 21. (2007) , The affect heuristic enables us to be rational actors in many important situations. But not in all situations. It works beautifully when our experience enables us to anticipate accurately how we will like the consequences of our decisions. It fails miserably when the consequences turn out to be much different in character than we anticipated. 
Somatic Markers
Besides the data on exercise-induced affective responses that were reviewed in previous sections, several other pieces of evidence from the literature seem to indicate that exercise may not register as a particularly pleasant stimulus in the memory of many people. The fact that displeasure, discomfort) and pain are freq uen dy raised as perceived b a . (watching a comedy show, reading a magazineS doing a crossword puzzle, or playing a compute; game) over exercise even though they had ratedthc sedentary and exercise oprions as equally "likedll and they were allowed to select their own eXercise intensity (Vara & Epstein, 1993 Ekkekakis et al., 2010) .
Especially considering that the majority of adults are inadequately active and overweight, we hypothesize that even a few attempts to exercise, if they led to experiences of diminished pleasure, might suffice to build a negatively laden memory trace for exercise. This proposition is similar to Damasio's (1994 Damasio's ( , 1996 idea of a somatic marker. According to Damasio (1994) , somatic markers are "a special instance of feelings [which] have been connected by learning to predicted future outcomes ofcertain scenarios" (p, 174). When a positive somatic marker is juxtaposed to a certain future outcome, "it becomes a beacon of incentive" (p. 174). Conversely, When the choice of option X, which leads to bad outcome Y, is followed by punishment and thus painful body states, the somatic-marker system acquires the hidden, dispositional representation of this experience-driven, noninherited arbitrary connection. Re-exposure of the organism to option X, or thoughts about outcome Y, will now have the power to reenact the painful body state and rhus serve as an automated reminder of bad consequences to come. 324 . 1 ~~{,v) ',?~i[h surgery, graduate school, and medical school) }}"r:as one such example. In such cases, the only way 1\'.~:;~~o override the rend.ency to avoid the immediately N;~:: (Elfving et al., 2007) , who are probably well :l~Wlt:,(System 1) somatic marker co-occurs with a posi-:: :~~~~~Jiye (System 2) cognitive evaluation of exercise and ; : :~~~QjJ~t~. meaning (e.g., its long-term health benefits), the :; 1~tfhances ofexercise participation should be increased.
:~t~~~~pnYersely, the co-occurrence of a negatively laden nJii!?~atic marker with a negative (or even a neutral I ; '~ti(~fi,ndifferent) cognitive evaluation should suffice tõ . '~~~~1:g~er the chances of exercise participation.
.~.
• /)'1,·.. ,.,·., t : : ,~~1;~~?}"'1here is also the possibility of a conflict between f; lih~·. two processes underlying decision making.
t 'f.~l~~r~sumably such conflicts occur often. It is possi- ' .~~glfthat in most cases, such conflicts involve a posit~~tj~f'cognitive evaluation ("I know exercise would be llit:, good for me") but a negative somatic marker derived from prior experiences (e.g., exercise is something that on a previous attempt felt unpleasant, uncomfortable, painful, boring, or embarrassing). In such cases, the behavioral choice would probably depend on which of [he two counteracting forces is stronger (with the weighing possibly taking place outside conscious awareness). On rhe one hand, mere are the questions of (a) how convinced one is that exercise would yield the desired outcomes and (b) how ,personally meaningful those outcomes are. On the other hand, there" is the issue of the consistency of unpleasant affective experiences during prior exercise attempts.
In the short run, small imbalances would probably allow at least a few additional exercise attempts (which mayor may not modify the somatic marker for exercise). IE however, the negativity of prior experiences is strong enough to tilt the scale heavily, the likelihood of exercise participation would be diminished. Theorists predict that in the long run, affective, "visceral," or "experiential" factors are more likely to prevail over "cognitive" or "rational" ones (S. Epstein, 1994; Loewenstein, 1996; Slovic, 2001; Slovic et al., 2007) . In other words, as long as prior exercise experiences have formed a somatic marker charged with negative affect (and additional attempts have failed [0 alter it to any significant extent), no cognitive evaluation or rational thinking, no matter how positive, might be strong enough to keep a person on the path to long-term exercise adherence. This is especially likely if the efficacy or efficiency of System 2 is compromised (beyond its already limited capacity) by factors that occur commonly in modern life, such as incomplete information, stress, or time pressure (Shiv et al., 2005) .
